


**REPORT OF THE  
COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL  
OF INDIA**

**FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 1991  
NO. 13 OF 1992**

**UNION GOVERNMENT - DEFENCE SERVICES  
RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF OTHER RANKS**



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


## PREFATORY REMARKS

This Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year ended 31 March 1991 has been prepared for submission to the President under Article 151 of the Constitution.

2. The Report contains a review on Recruitment and training of Other Ranks.

3. The findings contained therein are those which came to notice in the course of test audit and have now been consolidated as a review.



## OVERVIEW

- The peace establishment of recruitment organisation was revised upwards despite reduction in their work load consequent upon the steep fall in recruitment. This resulted in extra expenditure of Rs.78.06 lakhs (1987-88) to Rs.99.95 lakhs (1990-91).
- In the EME 6645 jawans were held surplus (March 1991). The recurring expenditure per month on this account was Rs.1.99 crores. The Regiment of artillery held 7243 of them surplus during 1987-88 involving an expenditure of Rs.1.88 crores per month. Over 29000 personnel were recruited in 1986-87 without approval.
- The criteria for recruitable male population was not revised even after revision of the minimum educational qualification in 1986. Consequently the data and the entire exercise for planning the recruitment have become unreliable.
- Irregular and fraudulent recruitment was observed in 29 cases in the Pioneer corps alone involving an expenditure of Rs.3.13 lakhs on pay and allowances on such recruits.
- In eleven Army training centres only 30.93 lakh training weeks were utilised during 1986-91 against a total of 55.78 lakh weeks available.
- There were delays of 1 to 19 weeks in commencement of basic training of recruits who reported to the centres.
- There were considerable delays ranging from 1 week to 3 years in commencement of technical training after the basic courses.
- There were delays ranging from 1 to 19 months in despatching trained Jawans to units .
- Relegation in training centres varied from 1 to 85 per cent; 37422 relegations resulted in an expenditure of Rs.4.87 crores.
- Out of 13 establishments the marksmanship grade was achieved by above 10 per cent of the recruits only in two training centres.



- Land held by similar centres imparting identical trainings varied widely from 0.18 to 0.90 acres per recruit in infantry, from 0.25 to 1.38 acres in Engineer Groups and from 0.27 to 0.62 acres per recruit in Army Service Corps centre. Staff per recruit also varied widely in similar centres.
  
- Expenditure on surplus staff in training establishments during 1988-91 amounted to Rs.15.28 crores.



# Recruitment and training of Other Ranks

## Part I - Recruitment

### 1. Introduction

The aim of the recruiting organisation of the Army is to ensure steady flow of the best available recruits to the Army in accordance with their demands as calculated by Record offices attached to Regimental/Corps centres. The demands are based on authorised and actual holding of Other Ranks (Jawans), retirements, promotions, availability of trained jawans, unforeseen and training wastages. The expenditure on pay and allowances of recruits in the Army and actual intake during the years 1986-87 to 1990-91 were as under:

Year	Pay and allowances of recruits	Intake
	(Rs. in crores)	(Numbers)
1986-87	72.38	55,488
1987-88	69.19	61,451
1988-89	72.18	47,555
1989-90	58.48	32,420
1990-91	54.62	36,536

### 2. Organisational Set Up

Army Headquarters (HQ) is vested with the executive control over the recruitment of all personnel included in the sanctioned establishment of the Army. Army record offices attached to Regimental/Corps centres indicate their requirement for Other Ranks to Army HQ based on discharges, releases, wastages and new arisings. Recruitment demands are finalised at Army HQ Directorate of Organisation and sent to the Recruiting Directorate who release 75 per cent demands to Zonal recruiting offices (ZRO) spread all over the country and the remaining 25 per cent to Regimental/Corps centres who are empowered to enrol recruits directly under the unit HQ quota. Under the orders of Government, recruitable male population (RMP) is that proportion of the male population which meets the qualitative requirements of the prescribed age limits (16 to 21 years in the case of an infantry soldier and varying upward age



for certain other trades) and standards of enrolments into the Army and is reckoned as 10 per cent of the male population of the country or the state or the district as the case may be (limited mostly to matriculates from 1983).

### 3. Scope of Audit

Out of 12 ZROs, one independent recruiting office (IRO) and 58 Branch Recruiting offices (BROs) spread all over India, 5 ZROs and 10 BROs were selected for test Audit Review. The audit sampling ensured an all India coverage. Holding of Other Ranks vis-a-vis authorisation, demands and actual recruitment of Jawans, expenditure incurred by the recruitment organisation, implementation of recruitable male population policy (RMP) and enrolment procedures were examined in audit.

### 4. Highlights

- Despite steep fall in recruitment from 89612 during 1984-85 to 36536 during 1990-91 there has been no reduction of staff in the recruiting organisation. The increase in cost per annum due to upward revision of peace establishment (PE) in 1985 was Rs.78.06 lakhs (1987-88) to Rs.99.95 lakhs (1990-91) (based on capitation rates).

(Para 5.1)

- Test check of holding of other ranks (ORs) during December 1989 and December 1990 revealed that Government incurred an expenditure of Rs.3 crore to Rs.3.73 crores per month on surplus holdings.

(Para 5.2)

- Due to recruitment of jawans for new raisings which did not materialise 6645 ORs were surplus in Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Corps (EME) alone as on March 1991 resulting in a recurring avoidable expenditure of Rs.1.99 crore per month. Artillery was holding 10458 ORs surplus in 1986-87 and 7243 ORs surplus during 1987-88 resulting in avoidable expenditure of Rs.1.88 crore per month during the year 1987-88.

(Para 5.3)

- There was a monthly expenditure 3.43 crores due to holdings of manpower in excess of numbers laid down by Government under 'footnotes' (additional to the establishment <sup>mk</sup> allowed for meeting special requirement of terrain and operational conditions).

(Para 5.4)

- Demands released for recruitment were being modified by the Recruiting Directorate at implementation stage. For example the demand released by the authorised Directorate in Army HQ for 1990-91 was 36390 but 39824 vacancies were implemented by Recruiting Directorate against which there was intake of 36536 recruits.

(Para 5.5)

- Despite steep fall in the intake percentage, shortfall in recruitment went up from 1.9 per cent in 1986-87 to 10.08 per cent in 1989-90. Shortfall in recruitment in nine regiments/corps ranged between 10 to 64 per cent.

(Para 5.6)

- 9.9 to 45.8 per cent of the total expenditure incurred by the recruiting organisation was on publicity through Directorate of Advertising and visual publicity.

(Para 5.7)

- Cost of recruiting one Jawan ranged from Rs.704 to Rs.1501 during 1987-88 to 1990-91.

(Para 5.7)

- The RMP was not revised in 1986 when minimum educational qualifications for most of the trades was raised to matric.

(Para 5.8)

- Irregular and fraudulent recruitment was observed in 29 cases in the Pioneer Corps alone involving an expenditure of Rs.3.13 lakhs on pay and allowances of such recruits.

(Para 5.10)



- Acceptance of illegal gratification, tampering of answer sheets, leakage of question papers, etc. were detected in the recruitment organisation.

(Para 5.11)

## 5. Excess staff

### 5.1 Excess staff in recruiting Organisation

The intake of recruits during the year 1983-84 to 1985-86 was as under:

Year	Vacancies as per demand	Intake
1983-84	1,19,893	1,02,143
1984-85	90,004	89,612
1985-86	73,058	71,140

Despite steep fall in intake in 1984-85 and 1985-86 the peace establishment (PE) of the recruiting organisation was revised upwards in November 1985. The increase in cost per annum for additional staff during 1987-91 based on capitation rates was Rs.78.06 lakhs to Rs.99.95 lakhs. The intake of recruits had further declined as would be evident from table in para 5.6.

Ministry stated in April 1992 that addition of 82 personnel in recruiting organisation was marginal as recruitment was no longer concentrated to martial races but was broad based in terms of areas and communities and system was modified to include tests under the supervision of Board of Officers. This statement could not be reconciled with the fact that there was only 70 percent intake in 1985-86 as compared to 1983-84 and there was a continuously decreasing trend thereafter. In response to an Audit query on proportionate reduction in staff, recruiting Directorate stated (August 1991) that action was in hand to revise the PEs. The Ministry stated in April 1992 that this proposal was for upward revision which was not approved by Government.

## 5.2 Holding of Other Ranks in excess of authorisation

Composition table units are laid down by the Ministry of Defence from time to time. Certain units like Engineer parks, Military Engineer Services and specified units of Signals, ASC, APS, etc. do not count against regular Army manpower ceiling. These are called non-composition table units. The actual strength of Other Ranks as on December 1989 and December 1990 exceeded the authorisations taking into account both composition table and non-composition table units as shown below:

Position as in -----	Authorised strength -----	Actual holding -----	Surplus -----
December 1989	9,14,391	9,24,445	10,054
December 1990	9,12,921	9,24,184	11,263

In addition to the above 63,218 and 48,560 recruits were undergoing training in December 1989 and December 1990 and a large percentage of these recruits were expected to be available as trained soldiers within the next four to five months against the recruitment demand of 36055 for 1989-90 and 39824 for 1990-91. The surplus holding was, therefore, not likely to be reduced. The expenditure incurred by Government on holding of surplus ORs for one month alone based on the above example worked out to Rs.3 crores and Rs.3.73 crores based on the capitation rates.

The Ministry attributed (April 1992) the surpluses to recruitment of additional 29,298 persons in 1986-87 pending approval of the Cabinet which did not come through. Surpluses in December 1989 and December 1990 were stated to be within the overall ceiling considering shortage of 7000 officers and manpower provided to Rashtriya Rifles. This contention is not tenable as no reply on the financial impact on the holding of additional persons was forthcoming. Further Rashtriya Rifles did not come into being in 1989/1990 and Government had decided not to provide additional manpower to them.



### 5.3 Violation of manpower ceiling

According to instructions issued by Government in April 1988, establishment of the units and formations should at no time exceed the ceiling strength.

The manpower ceiling for the Army approved by Government was X with effect from December 1987. Against this the manpower held as on December 1989 and December 1990 were X + 3132 and X + 3478 respectively. On the persistent violation of manpower ceiling from September 1988 to June 1990 being pointed out, Army HQ, stated (September 1991) that overall authorised strength taking into account composition table and non-composition table units taken together (without giving break up) had not been exceeded. Ministry's instructions of 1988, however, did not provide for such merging for manpower ceiling purposes. The position as in December 1990, again indicated surplus which called for remedial action in this regard. Further, it was also observed that Army HQ had released demands during 1985-87 for recruitment against new raisings even though they had not been sanctioned by Government. Due to release of 14422 vacancies during 1986-87 and 1987-88 for such raisings, 7238 ORs were rendered surplus in Electrical and Mechanical Engineering (EME) Corps alone. The unit concerned admitted that no suitable candidates were available out of these surpluses for re-mustering in existing deficient trades. As on March 1991, there are 6645 Other Ranks surplus with EME and the recurring expenditure on them worked out to Rs. 1.99 crores per month.

The Ministry stated (April 1992) that surplus in EME was partly due to a serious mistake committed in calculations for induction in the EME during 1986-87 and partly due to advance action taken for recruitment against new raisings pending approval of Cabinet which did not materialise. Ministry added that corrective steps have been taken while releasing recruitment demand for 1992-93, no vacancies would be released now against any surplus trades, induction planning had been refined and all personnel sections/record offices had been warned against over-bidding of manpower.

The Regiment of Artillery also became surplus of 10,458 ORs in 1986-87 as proposed new raisings were not sanctioned. During 1987-88 despite surpluses (+ 7243), 7307 vacancies were released. Artillery Directorate informed Audit in February 1992 that full facts of surpluses



were communicated to Army HQ (Adjutant General's Branch) from time to time and surplus manpower had been adjusted in future recruitment demands. The yearwise position of authorisation, actual holdings and surpluses since 1986-87 were however, not indicated. The avoidable expenditure on surplus (ORs) during 1987-88 worked out to Rs.1.88 crores per month.

#### 5.4 Holding of excess manpower under footnotes

The Government authorised staff on the peace and war time establishments of the Army from time to time. However, under certain conditions, mentioned as footnotes to these authorisations, additional staff can be posted at the discretion of lower authorities. In 1974 Government had agreed to a cushion of 'Y' personnel to cater for invocation of footnotes and modifications to the war establishments/peace establishments within the existing manpower ceilings. This ceiling was, however, exceeded. A ban was imposed on invocation of footnotes and modifications in August 1983 which was extended from time to time till July 1993. The impact of footnotes was more than 2 Y during December 1987 to December 1989. In December 1989 Army HQ had issued instructions to shed 7886 personnel. Despite this the position has not changed and as in November 1990 the personnel employed under foot notes continues to be more than 2 Y.

Monthly expenditure on holding of the personnel in excess of the prescribed cushion (excluding 6946 held in regimental centres commented elsewhere in part II of the review) on the basis of capitation rates for ORs worked out to Rs.3.43 crores.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that Organisation Directorate while releasing recruitment demand for 1992-93 have effected reduction as one time measure as a result of which manpower under footnotes will come down to Y by mid 1993. No explanation was given for non-compliance with the ban imposed in 1983 on invocation of footnotes.

#### 5.5 Demand for recruitment of other ranks

Recruits are enrolled against anticipated normal wastage rate and any additional manpower sanctioned from time to time. Army HQ issues instructions to Record Offices for placing demands for recruitment on the former through personnel sections of their services based on the

wastages. These are scrutinised by Army HQ and manpower demand is released for implementation to the Recruiting Directorate. A recruit counts towards the Army ceiling only when he joins the field force as fully trained soldier. There were variations between the demands released by Army HQ and implemented by Recruiting Directorate which could not be explained. The demand released by Army HQ, implemented by Recruiting Directorate and actual intake for the last 5 years were as under:

Year	Released by Army HQ	Implemented by Recruiting Directorate	Actual intake
1986-87	54413	56582	55488
1987-88	64579	64241	61451
1988-89	47669	52581	47555
1989-90	31013	36055	32420
1990-91	36390	39824	36536

The recruiting Directorate stated that shortfalls in a recruitment year are carried forward to the next recruitment year. Even if this was done the vacancies implemented did not agree with the total of vacancies released by Army HQ plus carried forward vacancies as shown below:

Year	Demand released	Carried forward vacancies	Total	Vacancies implemented by recruiting Directorate
1987-88	64579	1094	65673	64241
1988-89	47669	2790	50459	52581
1989-90	31013	5026	36039	36055
1990-91	36390	3935	40325	39824
Total	179651	12845	192496	192701

Since the demands are finalised by Army HQ every year taking into account all the factors at the time of finalisation, the question of addition of carry forward vacancies by the recruiting Directorate at the time of implementation is not expected to arise.

The Ministry stated (April 1992) that vacancies not implemented are carried forward by adding to the demands



finalised by Organisation Directorate and figures indicated by audit may not tally because demands for Army Postal service (APS) and direct entry Havildar clerks have not been taken into account. The reply is not tenable as the data was confirmed by the recruiting Directorate Army HQ. Data for APS has already been taken into account by the recruiting Directorate in the figures given above and the question of carry forward of unfilled vacancies does not arise as demand is finalised by the Organisations Directorate taking into account authorisation, holding, retirements, recruits under training, etc.

#### 5.6 Shortfall in satisfaction of demands

Despite the above position of demand being continuously calculated in excess of the requirements since 1988-89 as shown in para 5.5 there was a shortfall in meeting the demands distributed to the recruiting offices, during 1986-87 to 1990-91:

Year	Demand distributed	Intake	Shortfall	Percentage of shortfall
1986-87	56582	55488	1094	1.9
1987-88	64241	61451	2790	4.3
1988-89	52581	47555	5026	9.5
1989-90	36055	32420	3635	10.08
1990-91	39824	36536	3288	8.25

Regiment/Corps wise data relating to demands and intake for 1990-91 revealed that shortfalls in nine regiments/corps ranged between 10.6 and 63.5 per cent as shown below:

Regiment/Corps	Demand	Intake	Shortfall	Percentage of shortfall
'A'	1952	1659	293	15
'B'	2033	1663	370	18
'C'	324	284	40	12.3
'D'	259	208	51	19.6
'E'	197	98	99	50
'F'	1072	950	122	11.4
'G'	3000	2421	579	19.3
'H'	824	736	88	10.6
'I'	851	310	541	63.5

Although the recruitment is expected to be broad based for Jawans as a whole and distributed according to the vacancy position in various corps/regiments, it was observed that they were not evenly distributed among them; some of which were composite and had no class composition history like the signal corps, medical corps and EME (A, B, G, H above). The recruiting Directorate stated in October 1991 that this was due to the right material not coming forward and large number of failures in the written examination which was being made up through increased publicity and shortfalls were not alarming as to affect the operational preparedness.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that shortfall in 1988-90 were relatively high because of considerable modifications in the recruitment system. Shortfalls in nine regiments during 1991 would not be real as subsequently the demands were reduced in view of Government decision not to raise additional manpower for Rashtriya Rifles. It may be mentioned that Audit had examined the statistics in the context of performance of the recruiting organisation with reference to target given to them. In regard to the decision not to raise additional manpower for Rashtriya Rifles, this unit was sanctioned only in 1990/91. Statistics regarding serious regimental shortfalls indicated by audit relate to the Education Corps (63.5%), Bihar Regimental Centre (50 %), etc. Their involvement with the policy on Rastriya Rifles was, however, not spelt out by the Ministry.

#### 5.7 Expenditure on recruitment

Expenditure incurred by the recruiting organisation during the years 1986-87 to 1990-91 excluding the pay and allowances etc. of service personnel and cost per recruit in different years was as under:



Year	Total expenditure (excluding pay and allowances etc. of service personnel)	Expenditure on publicity through DAVP	Percentage of publicity cost to total	cost per recruit
	( Rs. in lakhs )			Rupees
1986-87	20.12	2.00	9.90	36.26
1987-88	24.39	3.21	13.16	39.69
1988-89	41.47	19.01	45.8	87.20
1989-90	40.99	17.24	42.05	126.43
1990-91	44.19	18.97 °	42.90	120.94

It would be seen that cost per recruit varied from Rs.36.26 to Rs.126.43. Combatant staff for recruitment organisation is drawn from Army units on two years tenure. If the expenditure on service personnel is also taken into account based on the capitation rates, the recruitment cost per recruit would be Rs.704 in 1987-88 to Rs.1501 in 1990-91. With the reduction in intake and consequently reduced ~~the~~ workload of the organisation, the staff (service personnel) employed and the expenditure on them could have been reduced by reverting the personnel on deputation to their parent organisation.

While agreeing that intake of recruits had come down, the Ministry informed audit (April 1992) that while it may not be possible to reduce the staff on de-novo basis, they were nevertheless reviewing the entire matter. The increase on publicity expenditure from 1988 onwards was stated to be due to recruitment parties being sent to remote areas for encouraging recruitment from those regions. This reply could not be reconciled with the fact that the expenditure on publicity indicated above was on advertisement through DAVP and not on movement of personnel.

#### 5.8 Recruitable male population

The current planning for RMP is based on census data of 1981. The RMP was, however, not revised in 1986 when minimum educational qualification for most of the soldiers was raised to matriculation. There were no discernible means for audit to verify the RMP statistics.



In reply the Ministry stated as follows:

"For the sake of simplicity, the RMP factor is taken as 10% of the male population since a study had suggested that the average number of males in the requisite age group in the country was around 10% and there were not much variations from state to state. For practical reasons the old system of estimating RMP has been continued beyond 1986, when the minimum educational qualification for soldiers (GD) was raised to matriculation." This statement did not explain the reason for not revising the RMP based on matriculate recruitable population.

#### 5.9 Expenditure pattern in BROs

An analysis of expenditure incurred in ten BROs revealed that there were wide variations in expenditure incurred on pay and allowances with reference to the total expenditure on establishment ranging from 57.31 per cent in BRO Madras in 1987-88 to 92.49 per cent in BRO Meerut during the same year. BRO Madras incurred lesser expenditure on pay and allowances ranging from 57.31 per cent of total expenditure in 1987-88 to 63.76 per cent of the total expenditure during the year 1989-90. The percentage of expenditure on pay and allowances to total expenditure in other BROs ranged from 89.87 per cent in BRO Guntur during the year 1989-90 to 92.49 per cent of the total expenditure in BRO Meerut during the year 1987-88.

During the years 1986-87 to 1987-88 while BRO Madras incurred 9.9 and 14.29 per cent of the total expenditure towards publicity, four other BROs incurred only 0.8 per cent (BRO Meerut in 1986-87) to 1.61 per cent (BRO Guntur in 1987-88) of the total expenditure on publicity. The expenditure incurred by BRO Madras on publicity in subsequent year was not available. IRO Delhi Cantt incurred 3 to 6 per cent of total expenditure on publicity during different years.

Thus, the allotment of funds among different BROs needs to be rationalised so that they get adequate funds for local publicity.

The Ministry stated in April 1992, that variation in expenditure on pay and allowances in different BROs was attributable to different position prevailing in the Area and the amount spent on publicity would be further examined in the light of the observation of Audit.

## 5.10 Irregular and fraudulent enrolments

5.10.1 Number of irregular and fraudulent enrolments in the Army was as shown below:

1986-87	60
1987-88	58
1988-89	39
1989-90	24
1990-91	32

Analysis of 91 cases pertaining to three zonal recruiting offices revealed that 16 cases pertained to wrong physical measurement, knocking knee, etc., despite medical examination by Army doctors, 14 were underage/overage cases, 23 cases pertained to lack of prescribed educational qualification, 13 cases related to tampering or bogus certificates and 25 cases related to wrong class or trades. 15 out of 16 cases in ZRO Shillong, 36 out of 49 cases in ZRO Pune and 7 out of 28 cases in ZRO Jabalpur were regularised by changing trade, transferrring to other regiments and sanctioning age relaxation. The position of remaining cases in these three ZROs was as follows (October 1991):

---

	ZRO Pune	ZRO Shillong	ZRO Jabalpur
Discharged	7	1	2
Outstanding	6	-	20

---

The period of retention of recruits in service prior to discharge ranged between one month to over five years.

The period in respect of outstanding cases in ZRO Pune and Jabalpur was as under:

---

Year of enrolment	No. of cases ZRO Pune	No. of cases ZRO Jabalpur
1982-83	-	1
1983-84	-	4
1984-85	1	1
1985-86	-	1
1986-87	-	1
1987-88	-	6
1988-89	2	-
1989-90	3	5
1990-91	-	1

---



5.10.2 Test check of 29 cases of fraudulent enrolment in the pioneers regiment revealed that the cases came to light as a result of verification of educational/birth certificates genuineness of which was apparently doubtful. The recruiting office/training centre failed to check the correctness and genuineness of the certificates before actual enrolment and no responsibility was fixed in this regard. It was also noticed that even after confirmation of falseness of certificates there were delays in discharging the individuals. Such delays in four cases ranged from 9 months to 29 months. The expenditure on pay and allowances of these personnel worked out to Rs.3.13 lakhs. While seeking sanctions for regularisation, expenditure on pay and allowances only was taken into account even though almost an equal amount was spent on their ration, accommodation, clothing, etc. No first information reports were lodged immediately with police authorities as laid down by Army HQ in 1980 as the concerned authorities were not aware of this procedure.

There were seven cases of persons medically boarded out of service because of diseases existing before enrolment although they were medically examined by the Army doctors before recruitment.

#### 5.11 Malpractice in recruitment

In response to an audit query recruiting Directorate stated that during 1986-87 to 1990-91, 48 disciplinary cases were initiated in the recruiting organisation for malpractices in recruitment. Out of these 10 cases pertained to illegal gratification for enrolment and remaining cases pertained to leakage of question papers, malpractice in enrolment, tampering of answer sheets, illegal issue of call up letters, carelessness in duty, etc. The Ministry stated (April 1992) that during 1986-87 to 1990-91 punishments were given to 37 officers and 11 cases were still under investigation.

While forwarding the comments on the points brought out by audit, the Ministry also stated that the entire matter of recruitment of Other Ranks was being examined by Government on time bound basis and the observation of Audit will be kept in view while undertaking this review.

## Part II - Training

### 1. Introduction

1.1 Out of an expenditure amounting to Rs.2915 crores on pay and allowances of the Army during 1989-90, Rs.2552 crores constituting 87.5 per cent related to pay and allowances of Other Ranks. In addition they are entitled to free accommodation,ration, clothing, leave concessions, etc. The capitation as worked out by Army Headquarters (HQ) for Other Ranks (Jawans) was:

1987-88	Rs.31,156
1988-89	Rs.27,959
1989-90	Rs.32,011
1990-91	Rs.35,874

Since 1988-89, the cost of personal wepaons and training ammunition is not included in the capitation amounts.

1.2 All recruits are required to undergo extensive training before their induction. The minimum period of colour service of a Jawan is 17 to 20 years with 2-3 years reserve liability. According to the wastage pattern for the years 1984 to 1988 calculated by Army HQ in December 1989, about 47000 Junior Commissioned Officers/Other Ranks retire every year. Personnel recruited and trained varied from 61451 in 1987-88 to 32420 in 1989-90.

Training of a new recruit is carried out in specially constituted training centres (Regimental centre) in two phases-the basic military training viz. drill and weapon training, field craft, etc. of 20 weeks and technical training (advanced training in infantry) ranging from 6 to over 99 weeks depending on the trade. During training, they are entitled to pay and allowances as well as accommodation, food and clothing according to scales laid down the cost of which was as under in 1991:

Pay and allowances	Rs.1193
Ration	Rs. 314
Clothing (initial)	Rs.7370



## 2. Organisation set up

2.1 The overall responsibility for the Army's training vests in the Director General Military Training (DGMT). The responsibility for production of charter, training syllabus and course contents, lengths, dates, etc. and related matters in respect of training establishments rests with DGMT.

2.2 Training establishments for Jawans are known as Category 'B' establishments. These establishments are under GOC-in-C commands for supervision of all training in addition to discipline and administration.

## 3. Scope of audit

There were 47 training centres for Jawans. The activities of the training centres for Jawans including the infrastructure created, duration of training period, relocations during the training period, delay by the centres in making available trained Jawans to units and quantum of grants authorised and received by them were test checked in 16 centres. Adequate number of centres imparting basic military training were included in the audit sample. Records relating to the last five years (1986-91) were examined.

## 4. Highlights

- In 11 centres only 30.93 lakhs training weeks were utilised during 1986-91 against a total of 55.78 lakh weeks available. In three infantry centres the under-utilisation was 1.50 lakh weeks against a total of 5.82 lakh weeks available. Such under-utilisation was 11.09 lakh weeks in two Artillery centres against a total of 18.85 lakh training weeks available. The shortfall in two engineer group centres was 5.49 lakh training weeks against a total of 10.92 lakh weeks available.

(Para 5)

- There were delays in commencement of basic training and also extensions of prescribed training durations. Delays upto three years and 19 months were observed respectively in despatch of recruits for technical training and in posting of trained Jawans to units after completion of training. The additional expenditure on recruits in respect of these cases



amounted to Rs.5.16 crores.

(Para 6.2)

- There was wide variation ranging from 1 to 85 per cent in relegation of trainees in 10 centres during 1986-87 to 1990-91. The cost of 37422 relegations resulted in an expenditure of Rs.4.87 crores. In one centre, relegations accounted for 60281 recruit weeks out of which 51 per cent were stated to be on account of lack of training facilities and 10 per cent on account of illness. Out of the amount of Rs.1.97 crores paid to the trainees on account of extension in training, lack of training facilities accounted for Rs.1 crore during 1986-1991.

(Para 6.4)

- Small arms (weapon) training forms the major part of training for which authorised quantities of ammunition are laid down. The overall shortfall in use of ammunition in one EME centre was 46 per cent. In an infantry centre, the average shortfall was 59.9 per cent. In an artillery centre where the overall shortfall was 52 per cent, the centre authorities indicated that recruits attained the minimum standard with this restricted exposure. Out of 13 establishments test checked, the marksmanship grade was above 10 per cent only in two. In four infantry centres the percentage was 5 or below. In two centres catering to one arm of the army with common recruitment pattern, marksmanship percentage was 1 and 18 per cent.

(Para 6.5 and 6.6)

- There was wide variation of land per recruit held by different training centres. The area held by four infantry centres varied from 0.18 to 0.90 acre per recruit. In two artillery centres, area per recruit was 0.36 and 0.61 acre, while in two engineer groups it ranged between 0.25 to 1.38 acres per recruit and in two ASC centres it was 0.27 and 0.62 acre per recruit.

(Para 6.8)

- There was wide variation in distance covered by vehicles for administrative duties in four training centres (as distinguished from training duties). The total distance covered with lesser recruits was

found to be more in all the four centres in some years. Apart from routine administrative duties, vehicles in training centres are used for driving training. As in 1990-91 seven establishments were deficient of 141 vehicles required for training (1 tonne, 3 tonne, etc.) while seven held 274 surplus. Shortage of vehicles in two centres was stated to have affected the training schedules with resultant relegation of recruits.

(Para 6.9 and 6.10)

- Staff per recruit ranged between 0.35 and 2.31 in infantry centres, between 0.34 and 1.41 in artillery and between 0.93 and 2.84 in Engineer groups. Centres 'A' and 'M' were showing surplus staff with lesser staff-recruit ratio and deficiencies when staff-recruit ratio was higher, where the surplus should increase. Centres D, E, G, K, I, L and P were continuously holding surplus staff as reported by them although according to Government orders, establishments are to get automatically reduced after three months of holding the surplus, and the surplus posted to other units. Cost of surplus staff worked out to Rs.15.28 crores (1988-91).

(Para 6.10)

- Though holding of personnel additional to the authorised strength was banned in August 1983, this was not observed. This resulted in an annual expenditure of about Rs.11.34 crores.

(Para 6.10)

- Cost of manhours lost in 4 training establishments due to non-observance of authorised working hours worked out to Rs.2.05 crores.

(Para 6.13)

- Two training centres had utilised Annual training grants (ATG) in excess of authorisation amounting to Rs.7.27 lakhs. Although the appropriation accounts for the years 1986-87 to 1990-91 indicate considerable under booking in ATG, DGMT was not aware of this.

(Para 6.14)



- Cost of training of Police officers and Forest rangers in <sup>two</sup> three training centres amounting to Rs.12.87 lakhs was yet to be recovered.

(Para 6.17)

- An expenditure of Rs.9.12 crores was incurred for construction of accommodation in a training centre in 1987 anticipating increased intake. The intake, however, remained even below the existing capacity of the centre till date.

(Para 7.1)

- 20 personal computers (cost: Rs.14.45 lakhs) installed in category 'A' establishments were reported to be defective (June 1991).

(Para 7.2)

#### 5. Unutilised capacity of training establishments

Army HQ consolidated the basic training capacity of 41 training centres and technical training capacity of 12 of them in December 1989 at 67454 recruits. The number of recruits under training as on December 1990 and March 1991 was 40,458 and 41,375 indicating that even the above capacity was being utilised to the extent of only 60-61 per cent.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that even the designed capacity changed with fluctuations in intake, even if not fully keeping pace. The capacity utilisation of 60 to 61 per cent might not be really correct. This contention is not tenable as Army HQ had intimated Audit in September 1991 that capacity of only 7 centres underwent change in 1991. In fact, the utilisation would have been less than 60-61 per cent as the recruits whose training had not commenced or who were idle for not having been despatched for technical training or posting to units have not been excluded.

The position was checked in detail in eleven centres and it revealed shortfalls in utilisation of training capacity. During 1986-87 to 1990-91 the unutilised training capacity ranged between 9 to 37 per cent for the infantry; 26 to 74 per cent for the artillery; 32 to 61 per cent in Engineer groups; 22 to 63 per cent Army Service Corps (ASC); 11 to 48 per cent in Military Police; 19 to 27 per

cent in EME and 5 to 40 per cent in clerks training centre. The details are given in Appendix I.

Total number of training weeks utilised by these establishments were 30.93 lakhs against 55.78 lakhs weeks available. Thus, 45 per cent of the available training weeks were not utilised in these training establishments. In artillery and engineer groups the loss of training weeks was 59 and 50 per cent respectively. In supplies and infantry the average loss of training weeks was 45 and 26 per cent. In November 1989 Chief of the Army Staff had directed reduction in the training capacity according to current force levels. Present position in this regard was not known.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that:

- One of the main reasons for under utilisation of capacity was the large fluctuation in the intake of recruits from year to year which was a legacy of the past due to bulk recruitment resulting in bulk discharges giving rise to another bulk recruitment. It was admitted that large variations in recruitment can adversely affect a number of parameters. It will certainly be possible to reduce large scale fluctuation by suitable advance planning and instructions would be issued to Army HQ to tone up the recruitment planning appropriately to reduce large scale fluctuations.
- Occasionally, on account of operational commitments trainees are employed to aid the civil authorities or on internal security duties
- In artillery centres there were large scale recruitment to cater for new raisings which did not materialise.

#### 6. Delays in commencement and completion of training and despatch to units

6.1 The duration prescribed for basic training of recruits is 20 weeks. After basic training, recruits undergo technical training for varying periods depending on their trade. In Infantry centres most of them are General Duty recruits who are given 16 weeks advanced training after completion of basic training. After completion of basic training the recruits of other specific trades in infan-



try and tradesmen in ASC, Engineer Groups, etc., are given technical training for varying periods depending on their trades.

A review of the time taken in commencement of basic training after arrival of recruits from recruiting offices in four centres revealed delays in the commencement of basic training ranging from 1 to 19 weeks. Out of a total of 1839 cases checked in audit in centre 'D' and 100 each in centres 'E', 'F', and 'O', delays beyond one week in 1957 cases was responsible for additional expenditure of Rs.31.05 lakh as below:

Centre	Range of delay (weeks)	Delay in wage months	Financial effect (In lakhs of Rs.)
'D'	1-19	2084	29.18
'E'	1-2	28	0.39
'F'	1-5	71	0.99
'O'	1-10	35	0.49
			----- 31.05

Centre 'E' stated in December 1991 that bimonthly system of recruit intake resulted in forming recruits squads every two months and causing delay in commencement of training. They suggested that recruit intake might be organised in such a way that squads could be organised every six months. Centre 'O' stated that average delay in commencement of basic training was 2 to 10 weeks which was due to erratic arrival of recruits in small numbers. It added that if recruiting offices send the recruits in batches of 10 so as to report the centre on a particular date this delay could be avoided.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that despatch of recruits to infantry centres in insufficient numbers had now been rectified by a new manpower policy and Army HQ have been requested to take necessary steps to minimise such delays through proper inter centre planning.

6.2 After completion of basic training the recruits who have to be given technical training as clerks, storekeepers, cooks etc. are despatched to the establishments imparting training in these trades. There were delays ranging

from 1 to 156 weeks in despatch of recruits for technical training. A comparison of prescribed durations of basic and technical training with actual durations indicated that actual durations were exceeded in five centres by 1 to 32 weeks. Time taken in posting of fully trained soldiers to units ranged between 1 week to 19 months. Expenditure on recruits for all these delays cases test checked amounted to Rs.515.58 lakhs. In addition to this considering that recruitment is based on vacancy position in units also; the units were deprived of trained soldiers during the period involved.

Centrewise data of excess durations in training, extent of delay in posting to units, delays in despatch for technical training and expenditure on recruits during these periods is given in Appendix II.

6.3 In two infantry centres 'A' and 'B' duration of 33 courses were extended by 3 to 32 weeks. Out of this the number of cases of extensions between 10 to 32 weeks were 2219.

Delays in despatch of recruits for technical training and/or posting to units were noticed in all the centres where these aspects were checked in audit. The maximum delay in despatch for technical training and posting to units was in two artillery centres ('E' and 'F') which has been analysed below.

	Number of cases	
	Centre 'E'	Centre 'F'
<b>Delay in despatch for technical training</b>		
upto 1 year	205	247
over 1 year upto 2 years	117	137
over 2 years	15	4
<b>Delay in posting to units</b>		
upto 1 year	482	1170
over 1 year upto 2 years	6	126



Centre A stated that they were "empowered to relegate the recruits". The reply is silent on actual reasons for such extensions. The reasons for exceeding the prescribed durations, delays in despatch for technical training and delay in posting to units after completion of technical training were stated by the other centres to be due to:

- large number of weak recruits;
- security duty commitments;
- allotment of lesser vacancies by establishments to which recruits were to be despatched for technical training;
- delays in verification of character and antecedents beyond the date of completion of training;
- time taken by Record offices (which are in the centre) in issuing posting orders;
- delays due to non-availability of vehicles for driving training;
- time taken in formation of batch of requisite number for technical training.

While admitting that there have been delays in despatch of trained recruits to units, the Ministry stated in April 1992 that:

- At times training was disrupted due to involvement of centres in operational exercises and Internal Security duties.
- Delay in verification of character and antecedents by civil administration was beyond control of the training institutions.
- Artillery centres have been asked to intimate the details of recruits available for posting to units one month in advance of termination of recruit training.

#### 6.4 Relegation of recruits

Recruits who are unable to pass the prescribed tests within the specified training period but are fit in all other respects for retention in the Army, are relegated at

the discretion of the commandants of centres for a maximum period of:

- six weeks during basic military training; and
- three months during technical/advanced training and pre/post attestation.

Recruits who remain absent without leave for less than 30 consecutive days during basic military training may also be relegated if otherwise found suitable for retention. Once the technical training has commenced, the discretion to discharge a recruit or retain him is left to the Commandant of the Centre. The maximum period for which a recruit can be relegated on medical grounds will be six months. This can be extended to 210 days provided the recruit forgoes his annual leave of 30 days to which he is entitled during recruit training.

An analysis in audit of relegations checked in ten centres indicated that there were 37422 cases of relegation involving 34809 months resulting in an additional expenditure of Rs.4.87 crores.

Name of the centre	Total number of relegations	Number of cases of relegation due to inefficiency and sickness	Relegations due to non-availability of staff and vehicles	Total period of relegations (in wage of Rs.) months)	Financial effect (in lakhs)
<u>Infantry</u>					
B	294	294	-	882	12.34
<u>Engineer Groups</u>					
C	1955	1034	921	3408	47.71
D	2098	2098	-	1243	17.40
<u>Artillery</u>					
E	2763	2763	-	1574	22.04
F	548	548	-	770	10.78
<u>Military police</u>					
G	470	394	76	949	13.29



<u>Supply</u>					
I	5576	2835	2741	6999	97.99
<u>Clerks training centre</u>					
N	1615	913	-	2948	41.27
<u>EME</u>					
O	1656	1656	-	1970	27.58
P	20447	-	-	14066	196.92
	-----			-----	-----
Total	37422			34809	487.32
	-----			-----	-----

Among the above, the yearwise relegations were particularly pronounced in the following centres:

Centre	1986-87	1987-88	1988-89	1989-90	1990-91
<u>'P'</u>					
Number trained	10907	11631	10351	3920	2947
Number relegated	6150	9915	3560	1985	241
Percentage of relegation	56	85	34	51	8
<u>'I'</u>					
Number trained	2270	2204	5953	5940	3380
Number relegated	1132	114	1580	1408	1342
Percentage of relegation	50	5	27	24	40
<u>'C'</u>					
Number trained	2971	2177	3045	2833	3008

Number relegated	487	467	185	293	523
Percentage of relegation	16	21	6	10	17

'B' Average relegations from course number 74 to 94 was 10 per cent. The percentage of relegation in course number 90 was 22.

'D'					
Number trained	Not available	1167	786	1214	Not available
Number relegated	Not available	369	597	158	974
Percentage of relegation	Not available	32	76	13	-

'E'					
Number trained	9478	4543	3190	2640	2445
Number relegated	1026	1088	352	266	31
Percentage of relegation	11	24	11	10	1

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Based on the data collected by audit, it was observed that while the percentage of relegation in an EME centre ranged between 8 to 85 per cent in different years, in an artillery centre the percentage of relegation during 1986-87 to 1989-90 ranged from 10 to 24. In the ASC centre the maximum percentage of relegation was 50, in one engineer group it was 13 to 76 per cent during 1987-88 to 1989-90 and in another engineering group the percentage ranged between 6 and 21 percent. The maximum percentage of relegation in an infantry centre was 22. Relegation in the above EME centre accounted for 60,281 recruit weeks of which 51 per cent amounting to Rs.1 crore in wage months was due to non-availability of training facilities and 10



per cent had been due to sickness. Relegations due to non-availability of instructional staff and vehicles and other administrative reasons in three other centres were 3738 out of 8001 recruits.

A clerks' training centre had returned 530 recruits to their establishments during 1986 to 1991 as they failed in entrance and special tests. These recruits were to be disposed off by the establishments concerned. The expenditure on 311 such recruits amounted to Rs.21.77 lakhs.

Centre I stated (January 1992) that presently there was a zero based relegation syndrome in that centre except for a totally weak recruit who might be relegated for a month or so subject to this period being deducted from his basic leave. In 1991-92 (after the issue of audit para) the relegation in the centre was only 3 per cent including on medical grounds as well as weak recruits.

The Ministry attributed the relegations in centre 'P' during 1986-87 and 1987-88 to the poor intake standards due to the bulk recruitment and lack of matching infrastructure in the centre. Audit examination, however, revealed that intake during the years 1986-87 and 1987-88 was considerably less than preceding 3 years.

The Ministry also stated that instructions were being issued to Army HQ to keep a closer watch on the performance of recruits so as to identify the weak candidates early on in the training and give extra attention to them so that relegation and consequent extension of training duration could be reduced.

#### 6.5 Use of training ammunition by recruits and trained soldiers

Major portion of individual training time in the Army is devoted to weapon training. The use of training ammunition is an important indicator of the quality of the training imparted to the recruits. The need for setting up uniform standards in this regard are manifest. It was noticed that only centre 'K' had fired the quantities of ammunition according to authorisation. The average percentages of shortfall in ammunition fired by eight training centres during last five years was as under:

	(Percentage of shortfall)
<b>Infantry</b>	
'A'	59.9
'B'	10.2
<b>Engineer Groups</b>	
'C'	50.1
'D'	39.7
<b>Artillery</b>	
'E'	37.9
'F'	52
<b>ASC</b>	
'I'	30.2
<b>Electrical Mechanical Engineer</b>	
'O'	46

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Infantry centre 'A' attributed the shortfalls to non-availability range according to their requirements. According to centre 'F' recruits attained minimum standard with quantity of ammunition fired. Infantry centre 'B' attributed the shortfalls to non-availability of troops due to their remaining on guard duties and temporary duties.

It would be seen that shortfalls in ammunition fired in infantry centres ranged from 10 to 60 per cent, in Engineer groups from 40 to 50 per cent and in artillery centres from 38 to 52 percent. In ASC and EME shortfalls were 30 and 46 per cent respectively. In infantry centre 'A' there was variation to the extent of 6.24 lakh rounds during 1986-91 between the number of rounds charged off and rounds actually fired as shown in the record of training batallions which needed investigation.

Centre 'E' stated (Janaury 1992) that they were now using 100 per cent ammunition authorised and shooting standards have improved due to this and extra coaching.

**The Ministry stated, in April 1992, that:**

- shortfall in the use of training ammunition is not that important an indicator of the quality of training given. (However, no indicator reflecting the quality of training was given.) Measures are being instituted to ensure avoidance of these surpluses.
- complete authorised ammunition could not be fired due to abnormally higher intake levels during the period coupled with limited availability of firing



ranges.

- comments on the difference in the number of rounds charged of and number fired in centre 'A' would be sent later.

#### 6.6 Evaluation of shooting standards

In general, at each range the required percentage of hits anywhere on the target will qualify for standard shot, one hit in the inner circle for first class shot and two hits in the inner circle for marksman. According to Army order on the subject the aim of phase-I training is to train and improve shooting skill of the soldier so that he qualifies in range course with good results. Out of thirteen centres checked, in four infantry centres the percentage of marksmen was between 1 to 5. In two engineer groups they constituted 3 to 5 per cent. In one artillery centre marksmen were one per cent and in the other 18 per cent. Military police had 95 per cent marksmen. In four other centres marksmen were between 2 to 7 per cent. In overall analysis the percentage of marksmen, standard shot and first class shots was 5.6, 75.7 and 16.7 per cent respectively.

Centres	Number tested	Marksmen	First class Shot	Standard Shot
<u>Infantry</u>				
'A'	7899	4	35	61
'B'	4390	5	33	62
'L'	6994	3	20	77
'M'	2488	1	19	79
<u>Engineer Groups</u>				
'C'	22239	5	20	70
'D'	4826	3	23	72
<u>Artillery</u>				
'E'	13284	1	9	87
'F'	3461	18	47	35
<u>ASC</u>				
'H'	23750	2	7	89
'I'	28948	3	9	85
<u>Military Police</u>				
'G'	2888	95	4	1
<u>Education</u>				
'J'	2959	7	32	58
<u>EME</u>				
'P'	693	2	16	82

Centre 'E' stated (January 1992) that with extra coaching, shooting standard had since improved.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that:

- Number of recruits attaining marksman grading appeared to be low;
- The aim of weapon training is to enable a recruit to handle his personal weapons effectively;
- Uniform training infrastructure at all centres could not be achieved due to financial constraints;
- In EME although there were no failures, efforts to improve the percentage of marksmen and first class shots were continuing.

6.7 At one infantry centre the distance upto which targets were engaged for rifle was only 100 yards. In two artillery centres also the distance upto which targets were engaged fell short of the required distances as shown below:

Centre	Type of weapon	Required range	Distance upto which targets were engaged
E	Rifle	300	50,100,200
	LMG	500	100,200,300
F	Rifle	300	100,200
	LMG	500	100,200,300

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that training value could be derived by firing weapons at intermediate ranges as well. It was also stated that centre E could not fire the weapons at longer ranges due to inadequate safety distance. In this connection it was observed that Army HQ had indicated in 1985 that one of the drawbacks of existing range courses was that targets were engaged only upto 200 yards for rifle and 300 yards for the LMG. "Whereas we teach and advocate the effective range of rifle as 300 yards and LMG as 500 yards"



## 6.8 Land

Area of land held and break up of land holding, where available, indicating the total area and the area used for training is shown in Appendix III.

Wide disparity was observed in the area per recruit in similar centres. In two identical Artillery training centres, area per trainee based on total land held was 0.36 and 0.61 acre per recruit. Similarly, in two EME centres, it was 0.32 acre and 0.48 acre per recruit. In four Infantry centres, area per recruit ranged between 0.18 acre to 0.90 acre per recruit.

Similarly, the area used for training per recruit in nine centres where break up of area used for training was available ranged between 0.03 acre to 1 acre per recruit. In different infantry, artillery ASC and EME training centres imparting identical training the range of area per recruit was 0.11 to 0.26, 0.16 to 0.21, 0.08 to 0.41 and 0.03 to 0.22 acres. It was evident that no assessment as to the exact requirements of land had been carried out by the authorities with a view to ensure whether the lands held by the centres were being gainfully utilised with reference to infrastructure facilities specific to training or were in excess of requirements as per their capacities.

The Ministry stated (April 1992) that extent of land held by a centre was more often than not a legacy of the past. Some centres have been in the same location since pre-partition days and there was very little flexibility in this regard; the large differences in training area per recruit was also a direct result of fluctuation in recruitment. This contention regarding fluctuation is not tenable as audit had worked out per recruit area based on capacity and not actual intake. Except for centre E the authorisation based on capacity was also not indicated.

During the course of audit of land records the following irregularities also came to light:

- i) Centre 'D' was producing fodder and issuing it to regimental Dairy without crediting any money to public funds.
- ii) Centre 'L' had declared 60 acres of land as temporarily surplus in 1958 which was under cultivation since then, however, in September 1986, an additional 24.83 acres of adjacent land was acquired for defence units at a cost

of Rs.16.91 lakhs.

iii) In centre 'P' about 200 acres of land was under encroachment. Civil suits for removal of encroachments were in progress.

#### 6.9 Vehicles

The authorisation of vehicles are prescribed in the sanctions (PEs). PEs also contain provision for increase/decrease of vehicles when the number of trainees exceeds/fall below, the designated capacity of the centres for over 3 months. The authorisation and holding of vehicles in 14 centres checked was as under:

Centre	Year					Remarks					
	1986-87		1987-88		1988-89		1989-90		1990-91		
	Sur- plus	Defi- cient	Sur- plus	Defi- cient	Sur- plus		Defi- cient	Sur- plus	Defi- cient	Sur- plus	Defi- cient

#### Infantry

'A'	12	-	13	-	15	-	16	-	17	-	Disposal awaited
'B'	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	7	-	10	
'L'	2	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	
'M'	2	-	1	-	2	-	1	-	-	1	

#### Engineer Groups

'C'	-	60	-	60	-	38	-	24	-	29	Deficiency lead to relegation of recruits
'D'	58	-	52	-	99	-	110	-	85	-	

#### Artillery

'E'	-	2	-	2	-	4	-	14	-	9	
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'F'	59	-	27	-	11	-	-	5	26	-	Formation HQ was responsible for not issuing transfer orders
<u>Military Police</u>											
'G'	-	5	-	3	4	-	8	-	8	-	
<u>ASC</u>											
'H'	-	59	-	51	-	71	-	38	-	35	
'I'	-	4	-	26	-	45	-	92	-	56	Deficiency lead to relegation of recruits
<u>AMC</u>											
'K'	-	17	-	9	-	6	-	10	7	-	
<u>EME</u>											
'O'	-	-	-	37	-	48	-	31	89	-	
'P'	-	366	-	370	0	170	49	-	42	-	
	134	513	94	558	132	384	185	221	274	141	

Failure to keep the vehicle holdings at various centres to the authorisation resulted in some centres having surplus holdings while others had to manage with deficiencies which had repercussions on the conduct of the training schedules and consequent financial effect as indicated in para 6.4.

Centres C, E and I stated that deficiencies of vehicles were reported to higher authorities regularly and vehicles were released based on priorities laid down by General Staff at Army HQ. Centre E indicated that they had submitted (December 1991) to their higher authorities to release vehicles to training centres on priority so that recruit training does not suffer.

**The Ministry stated in April 1992 that:**

- Sometimes it is more cost effective to retain surpluses in the same establishment than to transfer them

as a result of short term fluctuations in strength.

- Often surpluses are held for some time to be adjusted against wastages expected to arise in near future.
- Shortfalls in centre 'P' were due to heavy recruitment and when number came down in 1989-90 and 1990-91 vehicles became surplus. It was anticipated that during next 5 years training load was likely to conform to actual capacity.
- Out of 7 vehicles surplus in centre 'K', 4 have already been adjusted and 3 would be offset against wastages likely to arise in 1992.

#### 6.9.1 Use of vehicles

The number of recruits held, Kilometres run by vehicles on administrative duties as distinguished from training duties and distance travelled per recruit was examined in four training centres. The position was as under:

	'A'	'B'	'C'	'G'
<b>1986-87</b>				
Number of recruits	862	676	2971	1055
Km run on administrative duties (in lakhs)	2.05	2.48	6.26	2.39
Kms per trainee	238	367	211	227
<b>1987-88</b>				
Number of recruits	1049	654	2177	631
Km run on administrative duties (in lakhs)	2.47	3.09	6.79	2.98
Kms per trainee	235	472	312	472



**1988-89**

Number of recruits	1467	292	3045	777
Kms run on administrative duties (in lakhs)	2.65	2.57	8.16	1.27
Kms per trainee	181	880	268	163

**1989-90**

Number of recruits	552	709	2833	995
Kms run on administrative duties (in lakhs)	3.02	2.32	9.34	1.02
Kms per trainee	547	327	330	103

**1990-91**

Number of recruits	284	489	3008	906
Kms run on administrative duties (in lakhs)	2.61	2.00	7.31	0.84
Kms per trainee	919	409	243	93

From the above, it is evident that the distance run per recruit on administrative duties varied widely in the different centres. The range varied from 181 to 919 Kms, 327 to 880 Kms, 211 to 330 Kms and 93 to 472 Kms in centres 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'G' respectively.

- In centre 'A' distance covered with 552 recruits in 1989-90 was 3.02 lakh Kms although with 1467 recruits in 1988-89, the distance covered was only 2.65 lakh Kms. In centre 'B' distance per recruit in 1990-91 with 489 trainees was 409 Kms but with more trainees in 1987-88 distance per recruit was 472 Kms.
- In an engineer group with 3008 recruits in 1990-91 the distance per recruit was 243 Km while with 3045 recruits in 1988-89 it was 268Km per recruit.
- In the Military police centre Kilometer per recruit in 1988-89 was 163 with 777 recruits. In 1986-87 with

1055 recruits Kms run per trainee was 227 Km.

The Ministry attributed (April 1992) the variations in distance covered per recruit from centre to centre to proximity or otherwise of the training areas, distance of ranges and terrain conditions. It added that instructions were being issued to Army HQ to closely review the utilisation of vehicles with a view to reducing use of vehicles wherever possible. The reply did not indicate reasons for variation in distance covered in the same centre with identical areas/ranges and more distances covered with lesser recruits as compared to certain years in the centre.

#### 6.10 Staff

There were wide variations in staff/recruit ratio in some centres from year to year as well as similar ratio in identical centres. The staff/recruit ratio in infantry centres ranged between 0.35 and 2.31, in artillery centres between 0.34 and 1.41 and in engineer groups between 0.93 and 2.84.

In Engineer group 'C', it was noticed that when staff per recruit was 1.11 (1986-87), they declared surplus staff of 67. However, in 1987-88 a deficiency of 236 staff members were shown when staff per recruit went upto 1.35 and consequently the available surplus from the previous year should have increased. In centre 'A', 45 staff members were shown deficient in 1989-90 when staff per recruit was 1.11 although during 1987-88 even with 0.63 staff per recruit there were surplus staff of 83. In ASC centre 'I' there were 209 staff members surplus when staff recruit ratio was 0.26. In three centres 'A' (infantry), 'C' (Engineers) and 'M' (infantry) there were deficiencies of 45, 236 and 108 staff members when they had higher staff recruit ratio viz. 1.11, 1.35 and 1.68 respectively. Centre 'M' had surplus staff of 149 when staff recruit ratio was 0.62 but the same centre showed deficiency of 108 staff members when staff recruit ratio was higher (1.68).

In accordance with Government regulations staffing pattern is related to the number of recruits and when decrease in number of recruits is foreseen to extend over a period of 3 months, administrative and training staff has to be reduced by posting them out. Despite this, <sup>76</sup> training centres (D, E, I, G, K, L and P) were persistently holding surplus staff. The total expenditure on surplus staff in



respect of 14 centres calculated for the years 1989-90 and 1990-91 amounted to Rs.15.28 crores. There was not even one centre out of 16 which did not indicate any surplus in at least one of the five years from 1986.

According to a study carried out by Army HQ in November 1989 regimental centres had been holding 6946 personnel in excess of staff authorised on the establishment under discretion given in the footnotes to the sanctions. Based on the lowest capitation rates of Other Ranks for 1989-90 expenditure towards pay and allowances of surplus staff for one year alone worked out to Rs.11.34 crore. The discretion under the footnotes were invoked despite a ban imposed by Army HQ in August 1983 on operating this (which had been extended till July 1993).

Directions were issued in November 1989 that regimental training centres should shed 6000 personnel held under footnotes over and above their PEs within 3 months. The overall manpower under footnotes has, however, increased further as in March 1990.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that:

- Instructions were issued by Army HQ to infantry centres in September 1991 to return 631 instructors.
- The manpower under footnotes and sliding scales have been withdrawn from EME centres and Audit point noted for strict compliance in future.
- In ASC and AMC surpluses were built on account of specific necessity by withdrawing from units/centres.
- Marginal errors that occurred have been corrected and situation was being closely monitored by Army HQ.

The Ministry did not indicate the present position of surplus staff.

#### 6.11 Consumption of electricity

Quantity of electricity consumed per recruit was as given below:

Centre	Year									
	1986-87		1987-88		1988-89		1989-90		1990-91	
	No. of recruits	consumption	No. of recruits	consumption	No. of recruits	consumption	No. of recruits	consumption	No. of recruits	consumption
<u>Infantry</u>										
'A'	862	3314	1049	2723	1467	1947	552	5176	284	10060
<u>Engineer groups</u>										
'C'	2971	855	2177	1159	3045	818	2833	806	3008	903
'D'	1369	2864	1167	2838	786	4997	1214	3131	1564	2503
<u>Artillery</u>										
'E'	9478	Not available	4543	966	3190	1373	2640	1760	2445	1538
'F'	2515	471	1355	828	2087	554	2557	369	2611	323
<u>Military Police</u>										
'G'	1055	456	631	1029	777	702	995	564	906	706
<u>ASC</u>										
'I'	2270	456	2204	541	5953	200	5940	192	3380	341
<u>Clerks Training</u>										
'N'	3256	Not available	3012	Not available	5889	240	4591	349	5507	267

In eight centres test checked, consumption of electricity could not be ascertained as no separate meters were installed, even though QMG's Branch had issued instructions in April 1977 that all consumers including other than married accommodation areas should be metered. It was noticed from the data generated that there was wide variations in electricity consumption between centres where training courses were identical. For example the total consumption in centre 'C' in 1990-91 with lesser recruits was 2.25 lakh units more than that in the year 1988-89. In centre 'D' marginal increase of 47 recruits in 1989-90 over the number of recruits in 1987-88 resulted in increase in consumption of 4.89 lakh units. Centre 'E' consumed 2.56 lakh units (cost: Rs.2.56 lakh) more during the year 1989-90 when it had 58 per cent less recruits as compared to 1987-88. While there is strength in the contention that consumption could be related to the strength of recruits only partly, and basic requirement remain unaffected by the variation in strength, the table above indicated



that it was not possible to devise any relationship even when the strength of recruits were more or less comparable.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that Army HQ were being instructed to install separate meters for all consumers. High consumption rate in centre 'A' was attributed to electricity consumed in the open air cinema. Low consumption in Centre I during 1988-89 and 1989-90 was attributed to frequent failure/disruption of electricity and increase in consumption during 1990-91 to construction of 120 new quarters. The Ministry did not indicate as to why it was not possible to devise any relationship in consumption when strength of recruits was more or less comparable.

#### 6.12 Training of personnel in surplus trades and utilisation of tradesmen for other jobs

There are several technical trades in which recruits are trained by EME viz. vehicle mechanic, driver MT, metal smith, Armourer, tele mechanic, etc. In each of the two EME centres test checked there were simultaneously considerable surpluses in certain trades and deficiencies in other trades as shown below:

Year	Deficiency	Surplus
1986-87	8762	3366
1987-88	5400	3488
1988-89	2923	9084
1989-90	2070	8374
1990-91	1513	8374

Training in surplus trades, however, continued as shown below:

Name of establishment	Year	No. of trades	No. of persons surplus	Persons under training
O and P	1986-87	6	3129	1973
	1987-88	6	3050	1848
	1988-89	15	8003	6920
	1989-90	17	8020	3211
	1990-91	6	4428	1058

In view of these avoidable surpluses, during the test audit of EME centre 'O' the following were observed:

- vehicle mechanics, armourers, EE mechanics could not be used on their trained trades had to be used on computer for a period of 3 years by giving them further training.
- nine vehicle mechanics had to be utilised on construction work.

Centre 'O' explained that to reduce surpluses it was decided to discharge low medical category personnel and liberalise discharges on compassionate grounds.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that planning for training in various trades is done in advance based on anticipated wastages and when actual wastages differ surplus/deficiencies occur. The Ministry added that Army HQ were being directed to control recruitment/training in surplus trades at least in future.

6.13 Non-observance of working hours recommended by Fourth Pay Commission

There are considerable number of civilian officials in centre and record offices who deal with postings, service records as well as other matters. It was observed that three training centres 'D', 'E' and 'O' were not working for 40 hours a week as recommended by fourth pay commission and accepted by Government. Centre 'P' switched over to the revised working hours only in February 1989. The cost of manhours lost worked out to Rs.2.06 crore (1986-91) as shown below:

Centre	Pay and allowances of civilians for manhours lost (in lakhs of Rs.)
'D'	31.73
'E'	71.90
'O'	81.31
'P'	20.89
	-----
	205.83
	-----



Centre 'P' had already revised their timings from February 1989. Centres 'D' and 'E' have confirmed that they have since regulated working hours on the basis of the audit observation. Centres 'O', however, stated that they were not doing so in the absence of instructions from higher authorities for observance of revised working hours.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that non-observance of revised working hours in Centre 'O' has been corrected and all centres were now following revised working hours.

#### 6.14 Annual Training Grant

This is a grant made available in the Defence Services Estimates to Army HQ to enable the General staff to exercise administrative control over training and its expenditure. Against this grant are debited expenses connected with training camps, manoeuvres, tactical exercises, staff exercises, training conferences, and all other types of training laid down in the regulations. This grant is in addition to the expenditure on maintenance, salaries, food, clothing, weapons, ammunition, transport etc. Allotments from this sum are being made by DGMT. The amounts allotted and expenditure as per records maintained by DGMT and actual expenditure indicated in the Defence Services estimates on the basis of compiled actuals were as under:

Year	Allotment	Expenditure (in lakhs of Rupees)	Expenditure in Defence service estimates (Rs. in lakhs)	Difference
1986-87	612.00	612.00	539.80	72.20
1987-88	630.72	630.72	484.29	146.43
1988-89	647.84	647.84	597.50	50.34
1989-90	648.84	648.84	572.35	76.49
1990-91	648.84	648.84	573.51	75.33

The DGMT could not reconcile the discrepancy. They stated that according to their records no ATG funds remained unutilised/surrendered. This indicated lack of control by the DGMT in reporting expenditure although it was stated that training was adversely affected due to

paucity of funds as also the necessity of revising yardsticks for allotment of funds.

Expenditure incurred out of the ATG was test checked in centre 'B', with reference to yardsticks laid down in 1987 by Army HQ. The centre had incurred Rs.3.67 lakhs more than the amount to which it was entitled during the years 1986-87 to 1990-91, applying incorrect rates for working out entitlement of ATG for permanent soldiers. On the basis of yardsticks laid down centre 'M' had spent Rs.3.60 lakhs more than the amount authorised over a period of 4 years from 1987-88 to 1990-91.

The corps of military police establishment has a training centre with an attached school/college for officers which is separately categorised as a category 'A' establishment. Authorisation on ATG for the years 1987-88 to 1990-91 based on the recruits trained and staff held worked out to Rs.0.24 lakh to Rs.0.35 lakh but actual expenditure ranged between Rs.1.90 to Rs.2.50 lakhs. The excess was apparently utilised as ATG for officers on an adhoc basis as shown below without any laid down yardsticks on norms:

Year	Recruits	ATG authorised at Rs.30 per year	Staff held	ATG authorised at Rs.10 per year	Total authorised expenditure	Actual expenditure	Excess	No. of cadets/ students	Expenditure incurred on ATG per cadet based on excess expenditure
1987-88	631	18930	459	4590	23520	240000	216480	131	1652
1988-89	777	23310	450	4500	27810	190000	162190	203	799
1989-90	995	29850	524	5240	35090	220000	184910	144	1284
1990-91	906	27180	555	5550	32730	250000	217270	181	1200

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that while cash outflow of ATG to various allottees is 100 per cent, the debits accruing from bills submitted are delayed resulting in variations. Army HQ have now been instructed to submit accounts to the Defence Accounts Department by 15th May every year. When added together for accounting purposes these may not match with the notional yardsticks. The reply did not explain continuous less booking amounting to Rs.420.79 lakhs over a period of 5 years. While excess expenditure by some allottees over the amount authorised



according to yardsticks was attributed to allocations out of reserve with Army HQ to allottees for special training needs, action taken for applying incorrect yardstick by centre 'B' (as accepted by them) or continuous overspending by centre 'G' and 'M' was not indicated.

6.15 According to existing orders metal collected by formations, establishments and units from field firing ranges is required to be returned to ordnance and the money obtained from sale of lead and empty cases has to be credited to ATG. Out of 16 establishments only 4 (A, E, F and P) were complying with this requirement. They credited an amount of Rs.0.369 lakhs to ATG.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that instructions on retrieval/deposit of metals would be checked/reiterated.

6.16 Purchase of stores for Record Offices of centres and Libraries out of DGEME's workshop grant

Directorate General Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (DG EME) Workshop Grant is made by DGEME to equip EME workshops with machinery, plant and tools to enable them to function efficiently. It was noticed that during the last quarter of financial years 1986-87 to 1990-91 the grant had been utilised towards purchases not meant for equipping workshops, but for the Record Office, library and other sections of centre 'O'. Cost of 35 such items like colour TV, VCR, electronic typewriters, videocamera, etc., amounted to Rs.6.65 lakhs. Centre 'O' stated in September 1991 that covering sanctioned/sanctions were obtained for these purchases.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that purchases were in the interest of training. This contention is not tenable as the stores were not meant to equip workshop but record office, library, etc.

6.17 Non-recovery of cost of training

Cost of training in respect of personnel belonging to State Governments/Para Military Forces being trained in category 'B' establishments are to be paid by the concerned agency. The centres are required to intimate the recovery rates fixed by concerned Directorate of Army HQ, to the CDA concerned for effecting recoveries from the Department concerned. The following establishments did not

take any action to recover the cost of training. The amount outstanding for recovery was Rs.12.87 lakhs. When pointed out in audit centre 'E' reported the matter to Area HQ for necessary action.

Year	Establishment	No. trained	Department to which trainees belong	Amount outstanding (Rs.in lakhs)
1990-91	'E'	53	Police Officers from Maharashtra	6.36
1986-87	'D'	71	Forest Rangers (Forest Department)	6.51
1987-88		83		
1988-89		80		
1989-90		74		
1990-91		40		
				12.87

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that action was being taken to recover the dues.

## 7. Other points of interest

### 7.1 Injudicious creation of assets

Centre 'E' was designed to impart training for 4250 recruits at any one time. Based on the increased strength of recruits on some occasions and anticipated increase in intake in future, a proposal for construction of permanent accommodation for an additional training regiment was mooted by them in 1980. Ministry of Defence issued sanction in January 1987 for construction of permanent accommodation for new training regiment at a cost of Rs.772.63 lakh. It was observed in audit that the intake of recruits in 1986-87 was only 2179 and since then it has been persistently less than 4250. Notwithstanding this, the project was sanctioned and taken up for execution in 1987-88. Command HQ, in August 1989 apprehended that the accommodation constructed would be surplus to requirements. The centre admitted that they did not know how the accommodation could be utilised. Various possibi-



lities for utilisation of the accommodation like handing over to a Field Regiment/Air Defence Wing/Record Office etc. were explored but no decision had been taken (July 1991) as to how the accommodation could be put to use. The expenditure booked against the project upto June 1991 was Rs.9.12 crores.

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that:

- Upto 1989 it was visualised that planned capacity of centre 'E' would be increased. As such, the project was rightly undertaken. This contention is not correct as according to scales of accommodation laid down by Governemnt the criterion for constructing accommodation for training centres was average peak load of trainees over a period of 3 years.
- It was planned to utilise, the accommodation for another wing currently occupying temporary accommodation in a poor state.

The authorisation of the wing and whether Engineers had declared the temporary accommodation as unfit was not indicated.

#### 7.2 Functioning of Personal computers in Category 'A' establishments

In order to familiarise officers with computer system/technology, DGMT propped in January 1987 to establish 69 personal computers (PC) at 19 premier training establishments at an outlay of Rs.42.27 lakhs. PCs had been included in the 7th Army plan 1985-90. Besides the training of officers these computers were stated to prove useful for better inventory control, efficient management of training activities, etc. After technical evaluation/price negotiation in August/November 1987, a formal supply order for supply of 69 PCs to training establishments at a cost of Rs.47.31 lakhs excluding sales tax etc. was placed by the Ministry of Defence in December 1987 on a State PSU. In February 1988, 4 separate sanctions Commandwise for purchase of computer systems totalling this amount were issued by the Ministry and detailed contract for installation and maintenance of computers finalised on 1st March 1988. The total cost of 69 PCs inclusive of tax etc. was Rs.49.84 lakhs.

The computers were to be delivered within 6 weeks

from the date of issue of cheque for 10 per cent advance payment and installation was to be done within 4 weeks from the date of issue of cheque for 60 per cent payment against proof of despatch. The warranty period was 12 months from the date of acceptance of the system by user. 20 per cent payment was to be made on installation and acceptance and 10 per cent payment against bank guarantee for performance valid till 45 days after expiry of warranty period.

There was no time limit in the contract for ensuring participation in the acceptance test by the firm. The users were to provide suitable installation site including power supply and proper environment as per contract.

In July 1989 in respect of 23 nos. received DGMT stated that:

- 2 PCs were supplied to two establishments in 1988 but the firm's engineer did not report for installing them and carrying out acceptance test.
- 16 PCs could not be installed due to hardware defects at five training establishments since their receipt in 1988.
- 1 PC was awaiting installation at one training establishment as the users had not made available the site. Two establishments where 4 PCs were installed had been repeatedly reporting problem of defect prone hardware. Due to poor after sales service during warranty, downtime of these PCs was high and totally unacceptable.

The latest reports from training establishments as in June 1991 indicated that 20 PCs (cost: Rs.14.45 lakhs) were defective and in respect of 19 PCs there had been delay of about a year in installation. The delays in installation of PCs were either due to non-preparation of suitable accommodation or failure of firm to conduct acceptance test due to technical problems. The present status in regard to defective computers was awaited from DGMT (September 1991).

The Ministry stated in April 1992 that specific defects mentioned by Audit were being ascertained and details would be furnished later.



7.3 Functioning of para holding wing

A para holding wing functioning in establishment 'B' was running five different courses of 1 to 10 weeks durations. During the period 1986-87 to 1990-91, prescribed time schedules for these courses were exceeded by 1 to 17 weeks due to non-availability of packed parachutes, diversion of parachutes to other units etc.

Ministry stated in April 1992 that there was a chronic shortage of parachutes which was likely to persist for another one year or so. It was added that time schedules may have to be exceeded due to non-availability of parachutes for various reasons.



( A.K. MENON )

NEW DELHI  
Dated the

16 APR 1992

Additional Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General

Countersigned




( C.G. SOMIAH )

NEW DELHI  
Dated the

16 APR 1992

Comptroller and Auditor General of India





## Appendix I

(refer to paragraph 5)

Centre	Year	Available training capacity	Unutilised training capacity	Percentage of under- utilisation
<u>Infantry</u> ( in weeks )				
(A and B)	1986-87	83200	30413	37
(A,B,M)	1987-88	124800	55468	44
( " )	1988-89	124800	25234	20
( " )	1989-90	124800	10939	9
( " )	1990-91	124800	28622	23
		582400	150676	26
<u>Artillery</u>				
(E and F)	1986-87	377000	96927	26
( " )	1987-88	377000	229564	61
	1988-89	377000	233253	62
	1989-90	377000	280014	74
	1990-91	377000	269873	72
		1885000	1109631	59
<u>Engineer</u>				
( 'C' )	1986-87	156000	56557	36
( 'C' )	1987-88	156000	88083	56
( 'C' )	1988-89	156000	50623	32
(C and D)	1989-90	312000	190943	61
(C and D)	1990-91	312000	163736	52
		1092000	549942	50
<u>ASC</u>				
( I )	1986-87	119600	70094	59
	1987-88	156000	89903	58
	1988-89	156000	34748	22
	1989-90	156000	43923	28
	1990-91	156000	98292	63
		743600	336960	45

Military Police

( G )	1986-87	45760	22155	48
	1987-88	45760	21368	47
	1988-89	45760	17345	38
	1989-90	45760	5096	11
	1990-91	45760	7314	16
		-----	-----	-----
		228800	73278	32
		-----	-----	-----

EME

	1986-87		----- Fully utilised -----	
	1987-88		----- Fully utilised -----	
	1988-89		----- Fully utilised -----	
( P )	1989-90	197600	38163	19
( P )	1990-91	197600	53737	27
		-----	-----	-----
		395200	91900	23
		-----	-----	-----

Clerk training

( N )	1986-87	162760	8623	5
	1987-88		----- Fully utilised -----	
	1988-89	162760	47511	29
	1989-90	162760	64420	40
	1990-91	162760	52025	32
		-----	-----	-----
		651040	172579	27
		-----	-----	-----



Appendix II

(refer to paragraph 6.2)

Establishment	Extent of excess duration in training	Extent of delay in posting to units weeks	Extent of delay in despatch for technical training	Total delay (in wage months)	Expenditure on recruits for delayed period (in lakhs of Rs.)
<u>Infantry</u>					
'A'	1 to 10	-	-	2596	36.34
	-	5 to 31	-	53	0.74
'B'	3 to 32	2 to 14	-	9680	135.51
<u>Engineer Groups</u>					
'C'	-	-	3 to 12	125	1.75
	-	1 to 26	-	54	0.76
'D'	1 to 24	-	-	1291	18.07
	-	-	1 to 17 months	529	7.41
<u>Artillery</u>					
'E'	1 to 14	-	-	1319	18.47
	-	-	1 to 156	4002	56.03
	-	1 to 19 months	-	2323	32.52
'F'	1 to 24	-	-	1956	27.38
	-	-	1 to 117	3864	54.10
	-	4 weeks to 19 months	-	5988	83.83
<u>Military police</u>					
'G'	-	6 to 24	-	351	4.91
<u>ASC</u>					
'H'	-	8 to 56	-	1299	18.19
'I'	-	-	1 to 14	116	1.62
	-	11 to 30	-	467	6.54

<u>EME</u>						
'O'	-		2 to 13	-	84	1.18
	-		-	1 to 18	150	2.11
'P'	-	*	8 to 47	-	330	4.62
	-		-	10 to 14	251	3.51
					-----	
						515.59
					-----	

\* includes delay in technical training also.



Appendix III

(refer to paragraph 6.8)

Type of centre	Total area	Capacity	Area per trainee available	Area used for training	Training area per recruit
<u>Infantry</u>					
'A'	224.117	800	0.28	Not available	-
'B'	156.00	853	0.18	Not available	-
'L'	286.994	856	0.28	95	0.11
'M'	720.143	800	0.90	205.61	0.26
<u>Artillery</u>					
'E'	1517.960	4250	0.36	874.49	0.21
'F'	1824.10	3000	0.61	478.50	0.16
<u>Engineer Groups</u>					
'C'	1131.99	4500	0.25	Not available	
'D'	4148.664	3000	1.38	3008.61	1
<u>ASC</u>					
'H'	840	3112	0.27	243	0.08
'I'	1854.67	3000	0.62	1216.54	0.41
<u>EME</u>					
'O'	1041.57	3300	0.32	739.26	0.22
'P'	1838.45	3800	0.48	120.9	0.03
<u>Military Police</u>					
'G'	231.225	975	0.24	Not available	-
<u>Clerk's Training</u>					
'N'	551	3000	0.18	Not available	-

